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Abstract Preregistration entails researchers registering their planned research hypotheses, meth-
ods, and analyses in a time-stamped document before they undertake their data collection and anal-
yses. This document is then made available with the published research report to allow readers to
identify discrepancies between what the researchers originally planned to do and what they actu-
ally ended up doing. This historical transparency is supposed to facilitate judgments about the cred-
ibility of the research findings. The present article provides a critical review of 17 of the reasons
behind this argument. The article covers issues such as HARKing, multiple testing, p-hacking, fork-
ing paths, optional stopping, researchers’ biases, selective reporting, test severity, publication bias,
and replication rates. It is concluded that preregistration’s historical transparency does not facili-
tate judgments about the credibility of research findings when researchers provide contemporary
transparency in the form of (a) clear rationales for current hypotheses and analytical approaches,
(b) public access to research data, materials, and code, and (c) demonstrations of the robustness of
research conclusions to alternative interpretations and analytical approaches.
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Introduction
Preregistration has recently become popular in psychology
and other disciplines. Preregistration entails researchers
registering their planned research hypotheses, methods,
and analyses in a time-stamped document before they un-
dertake their data collection and analyses (Nosek, Eber-
sole, DeHaven, & Mellor, 2018; Wagenmakers, Wetzels,
Borsboom, van der Maas, & Kievit, 2012). This document is
then made available with the published research report to
allow readers to identify discrepancies between what the
researchers originally planned to do and what they actu-
ally ended up doing. Knowledge of these discrepancies is
supposed to facilitate readers’ judgments about the credi-
bility of research findings (e.g., Centre for Open Science, n.
d; Nosek et al., 2019; Nosek et al., 2018; Wagenmakers et
al., 2012). As Nosek et al. (2018) concluded in their Pre-
registration Revolution article, “preregistration improves
the interpretability and credibility of research findings” (p.
2605). But is this really the case?1 To address this question,
I distinguish between two forms of transparency: histori-
cal transparency and contemporary transparency.
Historical transparency allows readers to identify dif-
ferences between a researcher’s current hypotheses, meth-
ods, and analyses and their planned hypotheses, methods,
and analyses. In contrast, contemporary transparency al-
lows readers to identify differences between a researcher’s
current hypotheses, methods, and analyses and a range of
other potential hypotheses, methods, and analyses, regard-
less of whether or not those other hypotheses, methods,
and analyses were originally planned by the researcher.
Historical transparency is necessary in order for readers to
judge whether a researcher’s current approach is better or
worse than their planned approach. Contemporary trans-
1A distinction can be drawn between the perceived credibility of a preregistered study based on heuristics and social norms, and the actual credi-bility of a preregistered study, based on the actual impact of questionable research practices in that study. Following Field et al. (2020), I assume that“the actual credibility of a study is ultimately more important than how it is perceived” (p. 3). However, I would note that there is currently no clearevidence that preregistration increases the perceived credibility of research (Field et al., 2020).
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parency is necessary in order for readers to judge whether
a researcher’s current approach is better or worse than a
range of other potential approaches that may or may not
include their planned approach.
Preregistration only provides historical transparency.
It does not provide contemporary transparency. Contem-
porary transparency may be provided by (a) clear ratio-
nales for current hypotheses and analytical approaches,
(b) public access to research data, materials, and code,
and (c) demonstrations of the robustness of research con-
clusions to alternative interpretations and analytical ap-
proaches.
In the present article, I question whether preregistra-
tion’s historical transparency facilitates judgments of the
credibility of research findings over and above the infor-
mation that is provided by contemporary transparency.
In other words, I ask whether preregistration’s historical
transparency produces benefits beyond those provided by
contemporary transparency.
Several previous articles have questioned the added
value of preregistration (e.g., Baron, 2018; Coffman &
Niederle, 2015; Devezer, Navarro, Vandekerckhove, &
Buzbas, 2020; Donkin & Szollosi, 2020; Ledgerwood,
2018; Lewandowsky, 2019; Navarro, 2019; Oberauer &
Lewandowsky, 2019; Szollosi & Donkin, 2019; Szollosi et al.,
2020). However, none of these articles have distinguished
between historical and contemporary transparency, and
none have considered the full range of advantages that are
supposedly associated with preregistration.
Herein, I provide a critical review of 17 of the proposed
benefits of preregistration. The benefits are grouped ac-
cording to the three key stages of hypothesis testing: (1)
generating hypotheses, (2) data analysis, and (3) research
conclusions. Based on this review, I conclude that prereg-
istration’s historical transparency does not facilitate judg-
ments about the credibility of research findings over and
above the information provided by contemporary trans-
parency.
Generating Hypotheses
Preregistration can help researchers to develop high qual-
ity hypotheses and hypothesis tests. Preregistration’s his-
torical transparency can also inform readers about (a)
whether researchers generated their hypotheses before or
after conducting their tests and (b) any a priori hypothe-
ses that have not been addressed in the research report. I
discuss each of these issues in turn.
Facilitating the Development of Hypotheses and Their
Tests
Preregistration can help researchers to carefully plan their
hypotheses and hypothesis tests (Field et al., 2020). In ad-
dition, registered reports allow researchers to receive peer
review feedback about their research approach prior to
data collection (Chambers, Forstmann, & Pruszynski, 2019;
Field et al., 2020). This planning and feedback may im-
prove the quality of research projects. However, neither
planning nor feedback are essential features of preregis-
tration (Lakens, 2019, p. 223). Hence, preregistered re-
search projects can be poorly planned and have received
no peer review feedback. In contrast, non-preregistered
research projects can be carefully planned and extensively
peer reviewed (e.g., asmight occur in the case of a research
grant application). Hence, planning and feedback do not
distinguish between preregistered and non-preregistered
research. Consequently, although planning and feedback
may improve the quality of research projects, they are not
essential features of preregistration, and so preregistration
does not necessarily confer an advantage in this respect.
Identifying HARKing
HARKing refers to the practice of undisclosed hypothesiz-
ing after the results are known (Kerr, 1998). In this case,
researchers conduct a test, observe their test result, con-
ceive or retrieve a hypothesis that is relevant to this test
result, and then present this hypothesis in their research
report as if it was an a priori hypothesis rather than a post
hoc hypothesis.
Preregistration’s historical transparency can be used to
detect HARKing. If hypotheses are included in a prereg-
istration document, then hypothesis generation must have
occurred before hypothesis testing (e.g., Centre for Open
Science, n. d; ; Nosek et al., 2018; Wagenmakers et al.,
2012).
However, historical transparency is not necessary to
detect HARKing. Contemporary transparency may also re-
veal HARKing. Specifically, researchers may indicate in
their research report that their hypotheses were gener-
ated after they became aware of their current results. Hol-
lenbeck and Wright (2017) have described this research
practice as transparently hypothesising after the results are
known or THARKing.
It is also important to appreciate that information
about the time at which hypotheses are deduced from ob-
jectively a priori theory and evidence does not affect the
credibility of hypothesis tests (Lewandowsky, 2019; Mayo,
2015, p. 61; Oberauer & Lewandowsky, 2019; Rubin, 2017c,
2019a; Vancouver, 2018; Worrall, 2014). I provide two com-
mon examples.
First, a researcher who has viewed their current re-
sults may retrieve an old hypothesis from previously pub-
lishedwork and then claim that hypothesis to be supported
or contradicted by their current results (RHARKing, Rubin,
2017c, pp. 314-316). For example, Bleidorn et al. (2016, p.
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396) proposed that “men tend to have higher self-esteem
than women.” Hence, any researcher who has measured
gender and self-esteem in their study can undertake an
unplanned test of this objectively a priori hypothesis. In
this case, the researcher’s current result may be used to
increase or decrease support for the hypothesis because
the information provided by the result is epistemically in-
dependent from the information that forms the basis for
the hypothesis (Rubin, 2019a). Hence, the result is use
novel with respect to the hypothesis, and there is no dou-
ble counting (Mayo, 1996; Worrall, 2014). All that is left to
do is to appraise the validity with which the RHARKed hy-
pothesis has been tested, and this appraisal can bemade by
readers without knowing that the hypothesis test was un-
planned and that the researcher retrieved the hypothesis
after knowing their test result.
Second, a researcher may be inspired by their current
result to deduce a new hypothesis from objectively a pri-
ori theory and evidence that accounts for that result. In
this case, they may provide a theoretical rationale in their
research report that explains the steps in this deduction
from theory to hypothesis. Again, the current result can
be shown to be epistemically unnecessary in this theoreti-
cal rationale and, therefore, use novel with respect to the
hypothesis. Consequently, readers can (a) form an initial
belief about the plausibility of the hypothesis that is based
solely on the theoretical rationale and then (b) update that
belief based on the additional information that is provided
by the current result. Readers may undertake this pro-
cess in a valid manner even if they are unaware that the
researcher’s current result secretly inspired their deduc-
tion of the hypothesis, because this inspiration does not
form part of the information that is required in the the-
oretical rationale (Rubin, 2019a). For example, imagine
the reader of a research report who is presented with the
secretly HARKed hypothesis that “eating apples improves
mood” (Rubin, 2019a). The reader may form an initial be-
lief about the plausibility of this hypothesis based on the
researcher’s secretly HARKed theoretical rationale, which
is deduced from objectively a priori theory and evidence
that (a) Vitamin C improves mood, and (b) apples are rich
in Vitamin C. The reader may then update their initial be-
lief based on the researcher’s current result that partici-
pants’mean mood increased significantly after they ate an
apple a day for a week, relative to a control group.
Of course, flexible theorizing allows researchers to de-
duce a potentially infinite number of hypotheses from a
priori theory and evidence (Kerr, 1998, p. 210), and these
hypotheses can then be used to explain any set of results.
However, this flexible theorizing will often result in poor
quality theoretical rationales that obviously lack coher-
ence, breadth, depth, and parsimony. These negative the-
oretical qualities will detract from the plausibility of the
hypotheses and the credibility of the research conclusions.
Importantly, poor quality theorizing can be identified and
taken into account by readers in the absence of preregis-
tration (see also Szollosi & Donkin, 2019). Hence, prereg-
istration does not provide a credibility advantage in this
respect.
Identifying A Priori Hypotheses That Would be Other-
wise Suppressed
Preregistration’s historical transparency may also be used
to identify researchers’ a priori hypotheses that would be
otherwise suppressed in their research report, possibly be-
cause they yielded null or disconfirming results (Rubin,
2017c). However, the identification of such hypotheses is
not always necessary. In particular, if suppressed a pri-
ori hypotheses are irrelevant to the final research conclu-
sions, then their suppression will not bias those conclu-
sions (Leung, 2011; Rubin, 2017c, 2019a; Vancouver, 2018).
The identification of a priori hypotheses is only necessary
if those hypotheses are relevant to the reported research
conclusions. Preregistration’s historical transparency is
not necessary to identify relevant a priori hypotheses, be-
cause their relevance makes them obvious as alternative
explanations during pre- or post-publication peer review
(Kerr, 1998, p. 208; Rubin, 2019a). Hence, the suppression
of relevant a priori hypotheses is unlikely to be a serious
problem.
Finally, contemporary transparency may be used to re-
veal both relevant and irrelevant hypotheses. In particu-
lar, if research materials, data, and coding information are
made publicly available, then both relevant and irrelevant
hypotheses can be tested by other interested researchers
(Rubin, 2019a).
Data Analysis
Preregistration is supposed to facilitate the interpretability
of data analyses (e.g., Nosek et al., 2018). Here, I consider
two categories of data analyses: (1) general data analyses
(deviations from planned analyses and distinguishing con-
firmatory and exploratory analyses) and (2) data analyses
involving significance testing (alpha levels, multiple test-
ing, forking paths, p-hacking, optional stopping, and p val-
ues in exploratory analyses).
General Data Analyses
Identifying Deviations from Planned Analyses. Prereg-
istration’s historical transparencymay prompt researchers
to provide rationales for deviating from their planned
analyses (Nosek et al., 2018, p. 2602). However, as sci-
entists rather than historians, we should be more inter-
ested in researchers’ rationales for their current methods
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and analyses rather than in their rationales for historical
changes that have led to those current method and anal-
yses. For example, if a researcher preregisters Test A, but
then decides to use Test B instead, we should bemore inter-
ested in the rationale for using Test B than in the rationale
for the change from Test A to Test B. Of course, the ratio-
nale for Test B may include a discussion of its superiority
to a range of other similar tests, which may include Test A.
However, this rationalemay be put forwardwithout know-
ing that the researcher originally planned to use Test A.
Contemporary transparency provides information
about a researcher’s current data analyses and how their
results would be different in the case of alternative rele-
vant analyses. The validity and quality of a researcher’s
current analyses can be checked by comparing their re-
ported justifications and rationales for these analyses with
external information (e.g., articles on research method-
ology and statistics) and internal information (e.g., the
researcher’s publicly accessible research materials, data,
and coding information). The generality of a researcher’s
results under alternative relevant approaches can be
checked via robustness analyses (e.g., Thabane et al., 2013,
also called sensitivity or multiverse analyses) that indicate
how research results vary as a function of reasonable data
exclusions and alternative sensible data coding, aggrega-
tion, and analysis approaches. For example, a researcher
might reveal how their pattern of significant and non-
significant results varies when they conduct their analyses
with and without outliers and theoretically relevant co-
variates. Of course, preregistered research protocols may
plan to reveal this contemporary transparency. However,
it is not necessary for researchers to demonstrate that
they planned to demonstrate contemporary transparency
in order for contemporary transparency to improve the
interpretability of data analyses.
Distinguishing Confirmatory and Exploratory Analy-
ses. Preregistration is supposed to help to distinguish be-
tween confirmatory and exploratory data analyses, with
the assumption being that the results of exploratory hy-
pothesis tests are less credible than those of confirmatory
hypothesis tests (e.g., Centre for Open Science, n. d; ; Field
et al., 2020; Nosek & Lindsay, 2018; Nosek et al., 2018; Wa-
genmakers et al., 2012). However, the distinction between
confirmatory and exploratory analyses is problematic, and
preregistration does not clarify it (see also Devezer et al.,
2020).
Confirmatory and exploratory data analyses may be
defined as analyses that are preregistered and not pre-
registered respectively. However, in this case, the argu-
ment that preregistration provides a credibility advantage
by distinguishing between confirmatory and exploratory
analyses boils down to the tautology that preregistered re-
search is more credible than non-preregistered research
because it is preregistered!
Confirmatory and exploratory analyses may also be de-
fined in relation to a priori and post hoc hypotheses re-
spectively. However, this distinction is problematic be-
cause the a priori/post hoc status of a hypothesis can be
defined subjectively and objectively. To illustrate, imag-
ine that a researcher conducts a test, observes their test re-
sult, and then retrieves a hypothesis from previously pub-
lished literature to explain that result (i.e., RHARKing; Ru-
bin, 2017c, pp. 314-316). Is this hypothesis post hoc or a
priori? According to the subjective interpretation, the re-
searcher only knew about the hypothesis after they con-
ducted their test. Hence, the hypothesis is post hoc, and
the test is exploratory. However, according to the objective
interpretation, there is clear evidence that the hypothesis
was developed and known by other people before the re-
searcher’s test. Hence, the hypothesis is a priori, and the
test is confirmatory.
Preregistration provides historical transparency about
the subjective knowledge of specific researchers before
they undertook their analyses. Hence, it uses the subjective
interpretation to distinguish between a priori and post hoc
hypotheses. However, we should bemore concerned about
the epistemic independence between hypotheses and test
results than about the order in which hypotheses and test
results become subjectively known by specific researchers
(Rubin, 2019a; Worrall, 2014). From this epistemic perspec-
tive, the distinction between confirmatory and exploratory
analyses is irrelevant. Instead, what matters is whether
hypotheses have been either (a) deduced from objectively
a priori theory and evidence (prediction) or (b) induced
from the current test results (accommodation). Impor-
tantly, from this epistemic perspective, prediction can oc-
cur either before or after specific researchers become sub-
jectively aware of their test results (Rubin, 2019a; Worrall,
2014).
Data Analyses Involving Significance Testing
Pre-Specifying Alpha Levels. In most cases, researchers
use a default, conventional alpha level (significance thresh-
old) of α = .050. In these cases, there is little need for re-
searchers to justify their alpha. However, in some cases,
researchers use more liberal or conservative alpha levels
(e.g., α = .10 or α = .005). In these cases, researchers
may preregister their unconventional alpha levels in or-
der to provide evidence that their choice of alpha level
was not influenced by their specific results. For example,
a researcher may preregister an alpha level of .10 to pro-
vide evidence that they chose this more liberal alpha level
before knowing their current results. This evidence may
be particularly important if the researcher’s significant re-
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sults are based on p values that fall in the region of .10 to
.05.
However, historical transparency about the specifica-
tion of unconventional alpha levels is redundant in the
face of a convincing justification for those alpha levels that
is supported by contemporary evidence. For example, in
the case of a liberal alpha level of .10, a researcher may
explain why they regard it as being less important than
usual to be concerned about Type I errors given the specific
circumstances of their particular significance tests. Peer
reviewers and readers may then make judgments about
whether or not they accept this justification. Importantly,
a strong justification in the case of non-preregistered re-
search will be more convincing than a weak justification in
the case of preregistered research. Hence, preregistration’s
historical transparency is not necessary when contempo-
rary transparency allows a strong justification for uncon-
ventional alpha levels.
Identifying Undisclosed Multiple Testing. Preregistra-
tion allows the identification of otherwise undisclosedmul-
tiple testing (e.g., Forstmeier, Wagenmakers, & Parker,
2017). However, undisclosed multiple testing is only prob-
lematic if a researcher makes a claim based on multiple
tests of the same joint hypothesis. For example, a re-
searcher might claim that “eating jelly beans of any color is
linked to acne,” and then conduct multiple tests of this hy-
pothesis by investigating whether acne is associated with
eating green jelly beans, red jelly beans, yellow jelly beans,
and so on, for 20 different colors of jelly bean (Munroe,
2011). In this case, if a significant association is only found
for green jelly beans (e.g., p = .023), then it would be inap-
propriate for the researcher to conceal their other 19 tests
and conclude that “eating jelly beans of any color is linked
to acne,” because the familywise error rate (the combined
Type I error rate for all 20 tests of the joint hypothesis) is
relevant, and the alpha level for each of the 20 tests should
have been adjusted downwards (e.g., from .050 to .050/20
or .0025).
Preregistration’s historical transparency allows the
identification of otherwise concealed multiple testing by
revealing researchers’ plannedmultiple tests (e.g., the tests
of the 20 different colors of jelly bean). However, con-
temporary transparency provides the same information by
making research data andmaterials publicly available (Ru-
bin, 2017b, pp. 272-273). For example, in the jelly beans
study, a quick check of the research data and materials
would show that 20 different colors of jelly beans were
tested. Consequently, readers would be warranted in ques-
tioning why only green jelly beans were used to test the
hypothesis that “eating jelly beans of any color is linked to
acne.”
Of course, researchers could delete any mention of
non-green jelly beans from their research data and ma-
terials. However, this action would represent fraud, and
fraudulent researchers may also corrupt the preregistra-
tion process. For example, they may collect data, con-
duct analyses, and then submit a preregistration plan
and hypotheses that aligns with their results and pretend
that they collected their data after registering their plan.
Hence, the possibility of fraud does not help to distinguish
between preregistration and non-preregistration.
It is also important to distinguish between multiple
testing and multiple cases of individual testing. Multiple
testing occurs when several tests are used to make a sin-
gle claim about a joint hypothesis. In contrast, individual
testing occurs when a single test is used to make a single
claim about an individual hypothesis (Rubin, 2017b, 2019a;
Tukey, 1953, pp. 82-83). Familywise error rates and alpha
adjustments are only required in the case of multiple test-
ing. They are not required in the case of individual testing,
even if multiple cases of individual testing occur within the
same study. This point is important because it implies that
undisclosed individual testing does not inflate the alpha
level for reported individual tests. For example, imagine
that a researcher tests whether acne is associated with eat-
ing 20 different colors of jelly bean. If the researcher only
makes claims about specific colors of jelly bean (e.g., “eat-
ing green jelly beans is linked to acne, p = .023”), then they
are not testing a joint hypothesis, and an unadjusted con-
ventional alpha level of .050 is appropriate in each case
(Lew, 2019, pp. 21-22). Furthermore, failing to disclose
some of these individual tests will not impact on the valid-
ity of claims based on other individual tests. For example,
the probability statement that “eating green jelly beans is
linked to acne, p = .023” is valid regardless of whether
the tests of the other colors of jelly bean are concealed or
revealed.
Forking Paths. Forking paths refer to sample-contingent
tests in which researchers make decisions about which
tests to conduct based on information from their sample
(Gelman & Loken, 2013, 2014; see also Rubin, 2017a, p. 324,
result-neutral forking paths). For example, a researcher
might decide to include Variable A as a covariate in a test
because it is significantly correlated with their outcome
variable. In this case, a replication of their test would need
to follow this same decision rule: Include Variable A as a
covariate when it is correlated with the outcome variable,
but exclude it as a covariate when it is not correlated with
the outcome variable.
Forking paths represent a special case of the multiple
testing problem, because each fork represents two poten-
tial tests of the same joint null hypothesis in a long run of
hypothetical replications that follows the associated deci-
sion rule (e.g., the test that includes Covariate A and the
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test that excludes Covariate A). Consequently, each forking
path requires an alpha adjustment (e.g., to α/2).
Preregistration allows researchers to document fork-
ing paths ahead of time. However, forking paths do not
need to be preregistered to be identified (e.g., Gelman &
Loken, 2013, 2014) and accommodated (Rubin, 2017b, p.
273). For example, if a researcher explains that Variable
A was included as a covariate in their test because it was
significantly correlated with their outcome variable, then
it is clear that they have undertaken a sample-contingent
test. Consequently, it is clear that (a) future replications
that find no significant correlation between Variable A and
the outcome variable should not include Variable A as a
covariate, and (b) the alpha level for this test should be
adjusted (i.e., to α/2) to accommodate these two potential
tests.
It is also important to appreciate that the problem of
forking pathsmay be avoided altogether if researchers and
their readers condition reported p values on the analyti-
cal path that is actually followed in that particular sample
rather than on the two potential paths that might be fol-
lowed in hypothetical replications (Cox, 1958, p. 359-361;
Cox & Mayo, 2010, p. 296; Mayo, 2014, p. 232; Reid &
Cox, 2015, p. 300). In other words, forking paths are not
relevant in cases of conditional inference in which proba-
bility statements are conditioned on actual, current tests.
Forking paths are only relevant in cases of unconditional
inference in which probability statements are conditioned
on both actual tests and variations of those tests that may
be conducted in a long run of hypothetical replications.
Hence, a researcher and their readersmaymake the condi-
tional inference that a p value refers to a long run of hypo-
thetical replications of a test that always includes Covariate
A. In this case, no alpha adjustment is required to account
for the potential version of the test that does not include
Covariate A.
Identifying p-hacking. p-hacking refers to result-
contingent tests in which researchers continue to conduct
analyses until they achieve a significant result (e.g., Sim-
mons, Nelson, & Simonsohn, 2011) . Preregistration’s his-
torical transparency may be used to identify p-hacking.
However, historical transparency is not necessary when
contemporary transparency is available. For example, re-
searchers can confirm the absence of p-hacking in their re-
search reports by (a) actively affirming the disclosure of
their data collection stopping rule, data exclusions, mea-
sures, andmanipulations (Simmons, Nelson, & Simonsohn,
2012), (b) providing logical and principled justifications for
nonstandard data exclusions and analytical approaches
(Giner-Sorolla, 2012, p. 568), (c) providing public access to
their standard data analysis procedures (e.g., Lin & Green,
2016), (d) providing public access to their research materi-
als, data, and coding information (e.g., Aalbersberg et al.,
2018), and (e) reporting the results of robustness analyses
(e.g., Thabane et al., 2013).
Identifying Optional Stopping. Preregistration’s histori-
cal transparency can be used to identify otherwise undis-
closed optional stopping in which researchers repeat the
same test at different stages of their data collection until
they obtain a significant result (e.g., Lakens, 2019). Specif-
ically, historical transparency allows readers to check
whether researchers stopped collecting data earlier, later,
or at the same point at which they planned to stop collect-
ing data. However, historical transparency is not neces-
sary when contemporary transparency is available. In the
case of contemporary transparency, researchers may ac-
tively affirm that they did not conduct any interim data
analyses prior to their reported data analysis. They may
also demonstrate the robustness of their results by using
Bayesian hypothesis tests, because optional stopping is not
problematic for Bayesian hypothesis testing (e.g., Edwards,
Lindman, & Savage, 1963, p. 193; Rouder, 2014; Wagen-
makers, Lodewyckx, Kuriyal, & Grasman, 2010, p. 167).
It is also important to note that, assuming a potentially
infinite number of tests, a data collection stopping rule of
p ≤ α guarantees a significant result. Hence, if researchers
merely aim to decide whether or not a test result is signif-
icantly different from a point null hypothesis (in either di-
rection), then a p ≤ α stopping rule will result in “sam-
pling to a forgone conclusion” (Wagenmakers, 2007, pp.
784-785). However, in many cases, researchers aim to de-
cide whether significant results are consistent or inconsis-
tent with directional (dividing) hypotheses (e.g., Cortina &
Dunlap, 1997, p. 168; Cox, 1977, p. 51-52; Tukey, 1991,
p. 100). In these cases, an optional stopping rule of “test
until significant” is independent from the research conclu-
sion because significant results may be either consistent or
inconsistent with directional hypotheses. For example, a
significant positive correlation is consistent with a divid-
ing null of r ≥ 0 but inconsistent with a dividing null of
r ≤ 0, whereas a significant negative correlation is consis-
tent with a dividing null of r ≤ 0 but inconsistent with a
dividing null of r ≥ 0. Consequently, a replication of the
“test until significant” rule may produce a significant re-
sult that is in the opposite direction to the original result.
Hence, testing until significant does not result in sampling
to a forgone conclusion when the conclusion is that the sig-
nificant result either supports or contradicts a directional
hypothesis.
p Values Lose Their Meaning in Exploratory Analy-
ses. Some commentators have argued that preregistra-
tion is necessary because p values lose their meaning in
exploratory (non-preregistered) analyses (e.g., Centre for
Open Science, n. d; de Groot et al., 2014; Nosek et al., 2018,
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p. 2604; Wagenmakers, 2016). According to this argument,
the number of significance tests in an exploratory analy-
sis is unplanned and sample- and result-contingent. Con-
sequently, the number of tests in a replication of that anal-
ysis is variable and unknown. Researchers who replicate
the same exploratory analysis might end up with 20 tests
in some cases and 200 in others. Without knowing the pre-
cise number of tests, it is not possible to (a) calculate the
familywise error rate for an exploratory analysis and (b)
adjust the alpha level for each test to control this family-
wise error rate at its nominal level. Hence, p values lose
their meaning in exploratory analyses because they can-
not be compared to an appropriately adjusted alpha level.
Preregistration solves this problem by providing a clearly
defined plan of the number of tests in the data analysis.
However, the familywise error rate for the entire set of
tests in an exploratory data analysis is only relevant if re-
searchers are interested in testing a joint null hypothesis
that may be rejected following at least one significant re-
sult in this analysis. In practice, researchers are unlikely to
be interested in this studywise error rate, because the asso-
ciated studywise hypothesis is not likely to be theoretically
meaningful (Rubin, 2017a, 2017b, 2019a).
To illustrate, consider an exploratory psychology study
that measures participants’ gender, age, social class, in-
telligence, conscientiousness, and self-esteem. In this
case, a potential two-sided studywise joint null hypothe-
sis is: “Men, older adults, and people from a lower social
class background do not have either better or worse in-
telligence, conscientiousness, or self-esteem than women,
younger adults, and people from a higher social class back-
ground, respectively.” This studywise null hypothesis may
be rejected if the researcher finds at least one significant
gender, age, or social class difference in either intelli-
gence, conscientiousness, or self-esteem during their anal-
ysis. Hence, each of these tests would require an alpha ad-
justment if the researcher wanted to maintain the study-
wise error rate for the studywise hypothesis at its nominal
level. However, researchers are rarely interested in test-
ing studywise hypotheses such as this, because studywise
hypotheses rarely relate to meaningful theories. For exam-
ple, in the current case, no extant theory assumes that gen-
der, age, and social class differences in intelligence, consci-
entiousness, and self-esteem represent different instances
of the same effect. Instead, each effect is likely to be driven
by a different underlying process.
Hence, researchers are rarely interested in calculating
studywise error rates for studywise hypotheses. Instead,
as described previously, they are interested in calculating
conditional familywise error rates for theoretically mean-
ingful joint null hypotheses in which different tests are as-
sumed to assess the same underlying effect. For example,
a researcher might test the joint null hypothesis that “men
do not have better self-esteem than women on either Self-
Esteem Measure 1 or Self-Esteem Measure 2.” In this case,
the associated p values do not lose their meaning in ex-
ploratory analyses, because alpha adjustments can be ap-
plied relative to the specific joint null hypothesis in ques-
tion (e.g., α/2 in the current example).
Research Conclusions
Preregistration has been proposed as way of facilitating
readers’ judgments about the credibility of research con-
clusions. In particular, preregistration has been proposed
as a method of identifying researchers’ biases, selective
reporting, test severity, and null results. It has also been
proposed as a method of reducing publication bias and im-
proving replication rates. I discuss each issue in turn.
Identifying Researchers’ Biases
Researchers’ personal biases influence the design of pre-
registered tests, which influences the type of results that
are possible (Donkin & Szollosi, 2020; Landy et al., 2020;
Mayo, 2018, p. 10, p. 91; Silberzahn et al., 2018). Re-
searchers’ personal biases may also influence their prereg-
istered interpretation of potential results (e.g., which type
of results will be accepted as confirming or disconfirming
hypotheses).
Preregistration’s historical transparency allows read-
ers to identify when researchers have changed their initial,
preregistered biases to a different set of biases. However,
biases do not necessarily imply errors (Kruglanski & Ajzen,
1983, pp. 19-20), and historical transparency is not neces-
sary in order for readers to identify either biases or errors
in the researchers’ final conclusions. Contemporary trans-
parency is sufficient to reveal these biases or errors.
Preregistration has also been proposed as a method of
identifying when researchers fool themselves into believ-
ing their own conclusions (Feynman, 1974) due to confir-
mation and hindsight biases (e.g., Field et al., 2020; Nosek
et al., 2018; Wagenmakers, 2019; Wagenmakers et al.,
2012). However, it is often scientifically beneficial for re-
searchers and their readers to “fool” themselves in this
way.
Confirmation bias is a tendency for researchers to in-
terpret new evidence as confirming their hypotheses. This
bias is stronger when researchers view hypotheses as be-
ing more plausible (e.g., Butzer, 2019; Hergovich, Schott,
& Burger, 2010). Hence, confirmation bias facilitates scien-
tific progress by preventing well-established, highly plausi-
ble theories from being disconfirmed too easily. For exam-
ple, many scientists would not regard it as “foolish” to be
biased towards confirming the theory of evolution relative
to creationist accounts.
The Quantitative Methods for Psychology 3822
¦ 2020 Vol. 16 no. 4
Hindsight bias is a tendency for researchers to fool
themselves into believing that they predicted a result after
they become aware of that result. Hence, researchers and
readers may fool themselves into believing that they have
not changed their beliefs about a hypothesis because they
“knew it all along.” Importantly, however, this hindsight
bias does not prevent researchers and readers from under-
going attitude change about the hypothesis in question. It
only obscures this attitude change from conscious aware-
ness (e.g., Kane, Core, & Hunt, 2010). Hence, researchers
and readers may unconsciously update their belief about a
hypothesis, even if they fool themselves into believing that
they have not. Again, the hindsight bias is functional be-
cause it prevents peoples’ need for self-consistency from
obstructing scientific progress.
Identifying Selective Reporting
Preregistration has been proposed as a means of identi-
fying the selective reporting of results to support certain
preferred conclusions (“cherry-picking”; e.g., Nosek et al.,
2018). However, selective reporting may be biased or un-
biased, and only biased selective reporting is problematic.
In the case of unbiased selective reporting, unreported re-
sults do not bias the final substantive research conclusion
because they are unrelated to that conclusion. By analogy,
imagine that a woman uses a single urine sample to con-
duct (a) a pregnancy test and (b) a drug test. She later re-
ports the positive result for her pregnancy test but hides
the positive result for her drug test. This selective dis-
closure does not affect the validity of the woman’s claim
that she is pregnant. In contrast, biased selective reporting
would entail the woman taking 100 pregnancy tests and
then only reporting a single positive result while conceal-
ing the other 99 negative results. To illustrate further, un-
biased selective reporting would entail reporting all tests
of gender on self-esteem and concealing all tests of age
on prejudice in a research report that only makes claims
about gender differences in self-esteem (see also Rubin,
2017c, p. 316).
Biased selective reporting is problematic. However,
contemporary transparency is sufficient for its identifi-
cation in non-preregistered research. In particular, re-
searchers may (a) actively affirm their disclosure of all rel-
evant variables in their research (Simmons et al., 2012), (b)
provide public access to their researchmaterials, data, and
coding information, and (c) report the results of robustness
analyses.
Identifying the Severity of Tests
A test is severe if it has a low probability of confirming
a hypothesis when that hypothesis is false (Mayo, 1996,
2018). For example, a severe pregnancy test would be one
in which a pregnancy is only confirmed if five different
pregnancy tests all yield positive results. Test severity is
important because severe tests provide more credible re-
sults.
Preregistration may be used to identify the (subjec-
tively) a priori and post hoc status of hypotheses. How-
ever, knowing that a hypothesis is a priori or post hoc does
not provide any direct information about the severity with
which that hypothesis has been tested. Hence, as Lakens
(2019) explained, “the severity with which a claim is tested
is not necessarily impacted by preregistration....[and], pre-
registration does not automatically increase the severity of
a test” (p. 227). Indeed, preregistered a priori hypotheses
can undergo less severe tests than non-preregistered post
hoc hypotheses.
Non-preregistered statistical analyses can be severe. As
Mayo (1996) explained, “violating predesignation does not
necessarily conflict with NP [Neyman-Pearson] principles”
(p. 295). She argued that “creative postdesignation” (i.e.,
“exploratory” analyses) can also be used to provide severe
tests and concluded that “considerations of the creative
postdesignationist provide the groundwork for justifying a
break with overly narrow construals of NP methodology”
(p. 318).
Non-preregistered substantive inferences can also be
severe in the context of HARKing. As Mayo (2015, p. 61)
explained, “what matters is not whether [hypothesis] H
was deliberately constructed to accommodate data x, but
how well the data, together with background information,
rules out ways in which an inference to H can be in er-
ror” (see also Rubin, 2017c, p. 313). For example, in
non-preregistered research, (a) post hocmodel assumption
checks can be used to select themost appropriate statistical
null model for testing (Devezer et al., 2020; Spanos, 2010, p.
216), and (b) post hoc robustness analyses can be used to
rule out ways in which tests of the substantive hypothesis
are in error (Mayo, 2018, p. 281). Both of these post hoc
approaches increase the severity of the test.
In summary, non-preregistered research can involve
severe tests, and preregistration’s historical transparency
is not necessary to evaluate test severity. Contemporary
transparency is sufficient to evaluate test severity.
Increasing the Reporting of Null Results
Preregistration, and especially registered reports, helps to
increase the reporting of null findings (e.g., Allen &Mehler,
2019; Scheel, Schijen, & Lakens, 2020). However, null find-
ings represent the absence of evidence rather than evi-
dence of an absence (i.e., evidence of no effect; Altman &
Bland, 1995). Hence, preregistration’s revelation of null
findings does not serve to balance positive evidence with
negative evidence. Instead, it merely increases the report-
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ing of nonevidential results.
Certainly, the reporting of null results may (a) increase
the precision of estimates of effect sizes in meta-analyses,
(b) prevent future researchers from conducting similarly
nondiagnostic tests, and (c) hint at the presence of poten-
tial moderator variables when compared with significant
results. However, none of these points mitigate the point
that null results represent the absence of evidence. Conse-
quently, expert statisticians have advised that researchers
may safely “ignore” null results (Fisher, 1935, p. 16). From
the perspective of hypothesis testing in basic research, it
is more important to publish significant disconfirming re-
sults than to publish nonsignificant results.
Reducing Publication Bias
Publication bias occurs when there is a preference to pub-
lish significant and confirming results over nonsignificant
or disconfirming results. Preregistration’s historical trans-
parency addresses publication bias by revealing planned
tests whose results are unpublished. However, contempo-
rary transparency (i.e., publicly available data and mate-
rials) is sufficient to allow the identification and testing of
any relevant but unpublished hypotheses.
Registered reports help to reduce publication bias by
ensuring that editors and peer reviewers provide in prin-
ciple acceptance of a research report for the publication
solely on the basis of the information in its Introduction,
Method, and quality check sections and not on the basis
of its substantive research results (Chambers et al., 2019;
Nosek & Lindsay, 2018). In this case, editors and review-
ers are not influenced by whether the substantive research
results are confirmatory or disconfirmatory, significant or
nonsignificant.
However, preregistration is not necessary to under-
take results-blind peer review (Locascio, 2017; Walster &
Cleary, 1970). Editors and peer reviewers can review the
Introduction, Method, and quality check sections of a non-
preregistered study without being provided with access
to the study’s substantive results. A publication decision
can then be made in the absence of knowledge about the
study’s results.2 Hence, results-blind peer review is not an
essential feature of preregistration, and so preregistration
does not necessarily confer a credibility advantage in this
respect.
Improving Replication Rates
Many of the issues discussed above (e.g., HARKing, mul-
tiple testing, optional stopping, p-hacking, selective report-
ing, etc.) are thought to result in artificially inflated or false
positive effects that contribute to relatively low replication
rates (e.g., Simmons et al., 2011). Preregistration’s histori-
cal transparency makes these questionable research prac-
tices visible to readers, and so it may (a) deter researchers
from engaging in some of these practices and (b) reduce
the potential for the resulting research findings to be pub-
lished in peer reviewed outlets. However, contemporary
transparency may also achieve these outcomes.
It is also important to recognize that low replication
rates have been attributed to more than just questionable
research practices. For example, low replication rates have
been attributed to (a) insufficiently stringent evidence
thresholds (Benjamin et al., 2018), (b) insufficiently lenient
evidence thresholds (Devezer et al., 2020), (c) poor mea-
surement (e.g., Loken & Gelman, 2017), (d) model misspec-
ification (Devezer et al., 2020), (e) low power (e.g., Rossi,
1990), (f) poor theory (e.g., Oberauer & Lewandowsky,
2019; Szollosi & Donkin, 2019), (g) an underappreciation of
the influence of hidden moderators (Rubin, 2019b), and (h)
errors in substantive inference (Jussim, Crawford, Anglin,
Stevens, & Duarte, 2016; Rubin, 2017b, p. 274). Hence, it
is unclear whether preregistration is targeting the right set
of issues to increase replication rates.
Conclusion
Nosek et al. (2018) concluded that “preregistration im-
proves the interpretability and credibility of research find-
ings” (p. 2605). The present article provides a critical anal-
ysis of some of the reasons behind this conclusion.
Some of preregistration’s benefits are not essential
features of preregistration. In particular, planning
and results-blind peer review can be achieved in non-
preregistered research. Hence, preregistration is not nec-
essary to achieve the related benefits of improved research
quality and reduced publication bias.
In some cases, preregistration reveals information that
does not affect the credibility of the research results. In
particular, preregistration’s historical transparency may
reveal information about (a) HARKing, (b) irrelevant a pri-
ori hypotheses, (c) whether analyses are confirmatory or
exploratory, (d) conventional alpha levels, (e) undisclosed
individual testing, (f) theoretically meaningless studywise
hypotheses, (g) forking paths in conditional inference, (h)
optional stopping in Bayesian hypothesis tests, (i) testing
until significant with directional hypotheses, (j) deviations
from planned analyses, (k) confirmation and hindsight bi-
ases, (l) unbiased selective reporting, and (m) null results.
In other cases, contemporary transparency is sufficient
to reveal information that does affect the credibility of the
research findings, including (a) the results of relevant but
unreported hypotheses, (b) unconventional alpha levels,
2For a list of journals that are currently using a results-blind peer reviewing approach, please see https://jbp.uncc.edu/other-journals-involved-in-this-joint-initiative/.
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(c) otherwise concealed multiple testing, (d) forking paths
in unconditional inference, (e) p-hacking, (f) the absence
of interim analyses in significance testing, (g) researchers’
biases and errors, (h) biased selective reporting, and (i) test
severity.
Finally, it is unclear whether preregistration improves
replication rates. Table 1 at the end of the article provides
a summary of the key points raised in this article.
Based on the current review, it is concluded that pre-
registration’s historical transparency does not facilitate
judgments about the credibility of research findings when
contemporary transparency is available. In particular,
preregistration does not facilitate judgments of credibility
when researchers provide (a) clear rationales for their cur-
rent hypotheses and analytical approaches, (b) public ac-
cess to their research data, materials, and code, and (c)
demonstrations of the robustness of their research con-
clusions to alternative interpretations and analytical ap-
proaches.
Of course, in many cases, researchers do not pro-
vide a sufficient degree of contemporary transparency,
and in these cases preregistration’s historical transparency
may provide some useful information. However, histori-
cal transparency is a relatively narrow, researcher-centric
form of transparency because it focuses attention on the
predictions made by specific researchers at a specific time.
In contrast, contemporary transparency allows research
data to be interpreted and interrogated from multiple,
unplanned, theoretical and analytical perspectives while
maintaining a high degree of credibility. Hence, in my
view, the open science movement should push more to-
wards contemporary transparency and less towards his-
torical transparency.
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ment of hypotheses and
tests
Although planning and feedback may improve the quality of research, they are not es-
sential to preregistration, and so preregistration does not necessarily confer an advantage
in this respect.
HARKing Researchers can engage in transparent HARKing.Secretive HARKing does not reduce the credibility of research findings.
A priori hypotheses that
are suppressed
The suppression of irrelevant a priori hypotheses does not affect the credibility of re-
search conclusions.
Publicly available research data and materials allow the testing of relevant and irrele-
vant hypotheses.
Table 1 continues on next page.
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We should be more interested in the rationale for the current method and analyses





The distinction between confirmatory and exploratory analyses is irrelevant to the cred-
ibility of research results.
Preregistration does not clarify this distinction.
Pre-specifying alpha levels Conventional alpha levels are common and do not require a justification.Unconventional alpha levels can be justified in non-preregistered research reports.
Undisclosed multiple
testing
Undisclosed multiple testing can be identified by checking publicly available research
data and materials.
Undisclosed individual testing does not inflate the alpha level for reported individual
tests.
Forking paths Forking paths can be identified and accommodated in cases of unconditional inferencein non-preregistered research.
Forking paths are not relevant in cases of conditional inference.
p-hacking p-hacking can be identified in non-preregistered research via contemporary trans-
parency (i.e., active disclosures and justifications, publicly accessible research data and
materials, robustness analyses).
Optional stopping
Researchers can actively affirm that they did not conduct any interim analyses.
Robustness analyses can confirm research findings using Bayesian hypothesis tests.
Testing until significant does not result in a forgone conclusion in the case of nondirec-
tional hypotheses.
p values in exploratory
analyses
p values only lose their meaning in exploratory analyses if researchers test studywise
hypotheses.
Researchers do not usually test studywise hypotheses.
Issue Key Points
Research Conclusions
Researchers’ biases Biases do not necessarily imply errors, and both biases and errors can be identified innon-preregistered research.
Confirmation and hindsight biases can facilitate scientific progress.
Selective reporting Unbiased selective reporting is not problematic.Biased selective reporting can be identified via contemporary transparency.
Test severity Non-preregistered tests can be severe.Contemporary transparency is sufficient to evaluate test severity.
Reporting null results Null findings represent the absence of evidence.It is more important to publish significant disconfirming results than to publish non-
significant results.
Publication bias Contemporary transparency is sufficient to identify and test any relevant unpublishedhypotheses.
Results-blind peer review is not an essential feature of preregistration.
Replication rates Contemporary transparency may deter questionable research practices.Low replication rates may be caused by issues that are unrelated to questionable re-
search practices.
Note: Contemporary transparency refers to (a) clear rationales for current hypotheses and analytical approaches, (b)
public access to research data, materials, and code, and (c) demonstrations of the robustness of research conclusions to
alternative interpretations and analytical approaches.
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